From the AEGIS e-Journal, Volume 2 Number 11, November 1999
If we in the protective services do our jobs properly, nothing bad happens to the folks we are protecting. When nothing bad happens, two potentially disastrous things can fall out of this good fortune. The first bad thing is that someone can make the decision that protective services should stop, since a lot of money is being spent for no apparent reason. At which point something really bad happens. Second, we, the people providing the protective services, can start to take the job for granted, lowering our level of alertness. This is not unlike a cop who starts to believe that there are high-risk traffic stops and low-risk traffic stops, rather than recognizing the reality that there are high-risk traffic stops and unknown-risk traffic stops. At which point something really bad happens. One of the ways to keep alertness at an appropriate level is to look at what is being done from the other side; from the perspective of the bad guy. It is important to think of criminals as risk-aversive businessmen, and plan accordingly. This means that before criminals commit their crimes they spend as much time in intelligence gathering and planning as do legitimate businesses. In many cases, we discover that something between six months and a year has been spent choosing a potential target for the crime, investigating the target’s situation, watching the target, and planning the ÆGIS, November 1999 5 action. As with a legitimate business, detailed records are kept for analysis, and alternative plans are made. In many cases this process is repeated several times until an appropriate target for the crime in question is found. In order to prevent these crimes from taking place, we ideally want to be able to detect them in the planning stage. An effective way to do this is to plan these crimes ourselves. As we prepare the plans, and investigate the possible ways to commit them, we should become sensitive to others who are doing the same thing. Thus, if we plan to kidnap our boss, we will have to begin a surveillance of his activities, tracking his travels from home to work and back, and his other travels. Is our surveillance detected? If not, we have a problem, because it means that other, more ill-intentioned, surveillances will also go undetected. If our surveillance is not detected, then the counter-surveillance skills or the protective team definitely need brushing-up. Are we seeing anyone else doing surveillance? Have we taken counter- surveillance training recently? If we come across someone behaving as suspiciously as are we, then we need to take some appropriate corrective action. As we continue our surveillance and planning we will discover points of vulnerability. And if we are discovering these, so will a potential real kidnapper. This means that as the weak points are discovered, they must be strengthened. Points of risk are frequently found at those places from which we habitually come and to which we habitually go: We usually have one home and one office, and these are fixed points that cannot be avoided. As an example, on April 29 1992 the president of Exxon International, Sidney Reso, was kidnapped after a lengthy (four or five months) selection and elimination process. He was snatched when he got out to pick up a newspaper on the ground near the secluded mailbox at the end of his driveway. In Reso’s case this was an observable danger spot, as shown by the fact that at one point in the investigation an Exxon security person asked if that was where he was kidnapped (a question which apparently earned him a lengthy interrogation). If an obvious area of risk is identified yet not made safe, then shame on the protective team, or on those higher up the food-chain who won’t let them make it safe. If an obvious area is not identified, then shame on the protective team, or on those higher up the food-chain who won’t let them work to identify areas of potential danger. ÆGIS, November 1999 6